The Price of the Game: How the NFL Sunday Ticket Redefined Antitrust Boundaries in Professional Sports

The NFL Sunday Ticket litigation exemplifies the growing tension between collective organization and competitive freedom in the modern digital economy. It raises the question of whether the National Football League's centralized control over out-of-market broadcast rights constitutes an efficient joint venture or an unlawful conspiracy to monopolize consumer access to the league's content. But the dispute extends far beyond football; it tests the limits of antitrust law in an era where collaboration and exclusivity are sometimes indistinguishable from collusion. The outcome will not only impact how leagues and streaming platforms structure their broadcast deals in the future, but it will also redefine business coordination and competition in the world of sports and entertainment law.

The NFL’s organizational structure is composed of thirty-two independently owned franchises that collectively produce and market professional football under a unified brand. Each team has separate ownership, separate operational decision-making, and separate interests in its respective local markets. But together, they engage in national licensing, broadcasting, and advertising ventures that present the league as a single unified entertainment entity. This structure can create tension when the NFL’s business model involves arrangements that effectively bind the separately owned teams together.

Historically, local games were broadcast over the air on regional affiliates such as CBS and FOX, while marquee national games were distributed through network contracts with NBC and ESPN. However, as cable and digital platforms expanded, the NFL adopted an additional mechanism for out-of-market games designed to reach viewers outside their local markets. In 1994, the NFL introduced the premium out-of-market package known as Sunday Ticket via an exclusive deal with DirecTV; later, in 2023, distribution rights shifted to YouTube TV. This evolution from traditional local/national broadcasts to a single exclusive national package intensified the bundling and centralization of rights among the NFL and its member teams.

A central aspect of this dispute involves the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, which is a foundational statute in American economic regulation. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade–including things like price-fixing, bid-rigging, and market allocation agreements between otherwise independent entities. Section 2 targets monopolization and entities that unlawfully acquire or maintain dominance through exclusionary or predatory practices rather than superior business acumen. These provisions provide the legal backdrop for evaluating collaborative business practices. This is particularly important in industries such as professional sports, where cooperation among competitors can serve both legitimate commercial efficiency and, potentially, unlawful market control. 

The NFL Sunday Ticket litigation currently pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals illustrates the implications of these antitrust principles. The plaintiffs, millions of residential and commercial subscribers, filed a class action against the NFL and its member teams. The plaintiffs alleged that the league’s exclusive broadcasting agreement with DirecTV violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. In June 2024, following a closely watched trial in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, a jury returned a $4.7 billion verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. The NFL has since moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), arguing that its broadcasting arrangements are protected under existing antitrust exemptions and necessary for league operations. The case is now pending appeal, and has drawn national attention for its potential to redefine the sports-league business model and the structuring of media and licensing agreements under federal antitrust law.

While the NFL Sunday Ticket case has been framed primarily as an antitrust matter, its broader significance lies in how it illustrates the boundaries of lawful coordination between separate entities operating under a unified brand. At the heart of this issue is the NFL’s decision to collectively license all out-of-market broadcast rights through a single distributor, first DirecTV, and now Youtube TV. In doing this, the NFL transformed what would otherwise be thirty-two competing broadcasting rights into one bundled national product. This act raises a fundamental business question: When does cooperative organization become unlawful collusion?

In American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, the Supreme Court ruled that the league’s 32 teams are separate economic actors capable of conspiring under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. American Needle created the principle that companies that operate under shared branding or joint ventures must preserve some independence when it comes to their pricing, marketing, or distribution decisions in order to avoid litigation due to their acts being viewed as a single collusive enterprise. In essence, collective business arrangements must balance coordination with independence especially when it comes to control over their own pricing, marketing, and distribution decisions in order to maintain competitive diversity. While agreements of this type can be efficient, the court in  Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. assessed whether they foreclose a substantive share of the market or limit consumer access.  Businesses entering into exclusive arrangements should document legitimate justifications for their actions,  such as quality control or technological efficiency, in order to avoid any antitrust violations or claims. 

The NFL’s long-term broadcast contracts with DirecTV and Youtube TV demonstrate just how much exclusive distribution can blur the legal boundaries of corporations and force them into litigation. The plaintiffs claim that the NFL and its thirty two teams engaged in a horizontal price-fixing and market-allocations scheme under §1 of the Sherman Act by bundling all out-of-market games into a premium subscription package, inflating prices, and restricting consumer choice. Further, they allege that the NFLs exclusive contracts with DirectTV and YouTube TV foreclosed rival distributors. Finally, the complaint asserts a monopolization claim under §2 of the Sherman Act, alleging that the NFL willfully maintained monopoly power over the market for live out-of-market NFL broadcasts. The plaintiffs contend that because the league dominates the market, it is enabled to control prices and exclude competition within a narrowly defined product market. 

The NFL defends its collective sale of broadcast rights under the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, which permits pooling of televised games. However, this exemption was written for free, over-the-air television, not modern subscription based streaming. Further, the NFL argues that it functions as one unified business. However, courts are skeptical of this, emphasizing that structure alone cannot mask independent competitive interests. Lastly, the league also advances the idea of procompetitive justifications, asserting centralization preserves competitive balance and ensures product integrity across teams. The NFL draws this reasoning from Broadcast Music, Inc v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc where the court held that a blanket license practice was not automatically illegal and needed to be analyzed under the "rule of reason" to determine its actual competitive effects.

Overall, the ongoing Sunday Ticket litigation sends a message to businesses across the country that collaboration must never come at the expense of competition. Whether through licensing, distribution, or governance, organizations that centralize control must preserve autonomy not just as a matter of strategy but as a matter of law.

The outcome and broader implications of this litigation will certainly affect multiple parties and interests. A ruling for the plaintiffs would allow residential and commercial subscribers to recoup roughly $340 per season subscribed from 2011-2023. Furthermore, and most importantly, more readily accessible and cost-efficient football would be on the screens of football fans across the country on Sundays. Their preferred outcome would dismantle the current status quo of paying top dollar for all out-of-market games with the availability of single-team or individual market packages, allowing fans to pay only for the games they want to watch.

For the NFL, owners, and players, a loss presents significant financial risks. The league faces potentially massive monetary damages, which under federal antitrust laws can be tripled from the initial verdict. The jury's initial award of $4.7 billion could balloon to more than $14 billion, although this verdict has since been vacated by a judge, and the case is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. However, there is a strong possibility the Ninth Circuit will not have the final say in the case. In 2020, the Supreme Court declined to hear the NFL’s petition for writ of certiorari challenging the Ninth Circuit’s decision. However, Justice Kavanaugh noted that “antitrust law likely does not require that the NFL and its member teams compete against each other with respect to television rights,” opening the gates for the Supreme Court to grant review this time around. 

The NFL argues that allowing individual teams to sell their own out-of-market streaming rights could exacerbate disparities between wealthier and less wealthy teams, potentially altering the competitive balance across the league, a key factor the league aims to protect. Furthermore, broadcasting deals are a critical component of the league's revenue-sharing, which is unilaterally tied to the salary cap. A major financial loss or restructuring of broadcasting rights could negatively impact the players' collective bargaining agreement and affect player salaries. 

Regardless of the final ruling in the NFL Sunday Ticket litigation, the case is poised to trigger significant changes across the professional sports broadcasting landscape, impacting both the NFL's business model and the future media rights for other major leagues. “It’s going to require other leagues to take a close look at their model and make sure that the means by which they’re providing consumer choice really does ensure true choice,” said Christine Bartholomew, Vice Dean and Professor of University at  Buffalo School of Law.

The market could experience fragmentation, leading to the league or individual teams offering packages to individual markets, directly benefiting fans who wish to pay only for single teams instead of a mandatory, costly bundle. A loss for the NFL could spur similar challenges against the MLB, NBA, and NHL, all of which have their own out-of-market viewing packages. While these leagues currently market their broadcasting rights on multiple entertainment services, which is a point of distinction from the NFL's past model, the core issue of bundling may still be scrutinized. Ari Lightman, a professor of digital media and marketing at Carnegie Mellon, said that leagues “need to understand different audiences in terms of where they exist, how fans interact and what they’re looking for,” he said. “They want things that fit and are personalized to their needs because anything in excess that they're paying for is unwanted stuff, which is the whole idea around bundling.” 

Leagues like MLS, with its exclusive Apple deal, may attempt to differentiate themselves by asserting that their agreement has no restrictions on out-of-market games and that their structure as a single entity insulates them from the antitrust claims facing the NFL, as their teams are not considered independently managed competing businesses. Whatever the outcome of the pending litigation is, it could potentially prompt Congressional action to review and expand the limited antitrust exceptions currently provided to sports leagues under the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961.

Ultimately, the result of this pending litigation is likely to cause a shift in sports broadcasting across the nation. As new services compete with legacy media, it is important to ensure antitrust law promotes competition and benefits consumers. Antitrust exemptions come with risk, however, and it may be time for Congress to eliminate the statutory exemptions and allow courts to examine individual conduct on the merits. Regardless of what Congress decides to do, it must strike a balance between ensuring parity among leagues and technologies to unify regulations and promote competition while simultaneously ensuring consumers have cost efficient options to watch their favorite sports.

*The views expressed in this article do not represent the views of Santa Clara University.